A body evolved : the UN Security Council and its role in international politics. by Davis, Matthew Brandon
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors 
Theses College of Arts & Sciences 
5-2010 
A body evolved : the UN Security Council and its role in 
international politics. 
Matthew Brandon Davis 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors 
 Part of the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Davis, Matthew Brandon, "A body evolved : the UN Security Council and its role in international politics." 
(2010). College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses. Paper 149. 
Retrieved from https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors/149 
This Senior Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at ThinkIR: 
The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Arts & Sciences 
Senior Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional 
Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, 
please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
A Body Evolved: The UN Security Council and its Role in International Politics 
By 
Matthew Brandon Davis 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for Graduation magna cum laude 
and 
for Graduation with Honors from the Department of Political Science 




In 1945, the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the international 
system was entrusted to the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) under Article 24 of the 
United Nations Charter. Parties to the Charter authorized the Security Council to act on their 
behalf on matters of security. I Since its first meeting in 1946, the Security Council has valiantly 
attempted to live up to that defining responsibility; however, the Security Council has partially 
failed to do so, and in the process has evolved into the primary legitimizing body for the actions 
and objectives ofthe U.N. member states and goals of the member states in the international 
arena. Although the Security Council was created to operate under a system of collective 
security, the system never came to fruition owing to a number of institutional incapacities and a 
general lack of political will. Moreover, as the lofty goals of a collective security system soon 
withered, the Security Council shifted focus to operations involving peace-making, peace-
building, and peace-keeping as a means of exercising its authority over the international 
community. Many of these efforts were ill-fated and often lacked sufficient support, resources, 
and troop contributions to achieve their stated UN mandates. Events such as those in Rwanda, 
Bosnia, and Somalia demonstrate the institutional paralysis that has often gripped the Security 
Council and prevented any significant form of action. 
In what has been viewed as a continuously evolving response to these failures, the 
Security Council has moved to adopt a new role: it has become the legitimizing body for the 
policies and actions abroad of UN member states. Often, resolutions passed by the Security 
Council act to bestow political and operational legitimacy on member state actions or policies. In 
a similar vein, states seem to act as if it would be costly to proceed without the blessing of the 
1 http://www.un.org!en/documents/charter/chapterS.shtml, Accessed Feb. 13, 2010. 
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Security Council. By conferring said legitimacy, the Security Council draws upon its own 
institutionalized perception of legitimacy as afforded by member states. 
Davis 
The question then emerges: is the Security Council the legitimate body to confer 
legitimacy on the policies and actions of UN member states acting to carry out operations under 
Article VII of the UN Charter? The Security Council is currently comprised of fifteen member 
states; five members - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, 
and France -- hold a permanent seat on the Council (the P5). The founders of UN chose these 
states for permanent membership to the Council as a means of compromise in order to secure the 
support of the major allied powers after the conclusion of World War II. The ten non-permanent 
members are elected by the General Assembly for a term of two years and are not eligible for 
immediate re-election. The number of non-permanent members was increased in 1965 from six 
to ten by an amendment to the UN Charter. Each Council member has one vote; decisions on 
procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the fifteen members, while 
decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five 
permanent members. Here, a permanent member state may veto a resolution by refusing to 
provide a concurring vote with the remaining members of the P5. 
Owing to this configuration, critics of the Security Council argue that it ultimately lacks 
legitimacy for three primary reasons. First, the power wielded within the Council is largely non-
democratic given the preponderance of the P5 over the non-permanent members on every major 
decision. Second, the membership of the Security Council fails to represent geographic regions 
of the world equally and often excludes those states found in the third world. Finally, even if a 
democratically constructed Council were not desirable, the current status of the P5 fails to reflect 
the modem power distribution in the international system. While France and the United 
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Kingdom have waned in international prominence since the conclusion of World War II, states 
such as Japan, Germany, and India have increasingly expanded their role on the international 
stage and yet lack official recognition as major powers. 
II. Collective (In)Security and the Security Council 
The notion of collective security has generated much scholarly debate since its inception 
following the World War I. The desire to mitigate the destruction and loss of life in future wars 
has led many states to adopt at least the theory of collective security in the hopes of promoting 
peace rather than perpetuating the constant cycle of aggression among states. It has competed 
for supremacy against other theories such as balance of power, and yet examples of its effective 
application are the exception rather than the norm. 
A. Assumptions Behind Collective Security 
Scholars have discovered that it is the assumptions within the collective security theory 
that need close scrutiny. According to Inis Claude, "the doctrine of collective security is a 
prescription for an institutionalized arrangement to maintain the security of all members of a 
system of states by guaranteeing that an attack by any member against another will engender the 
combined resistance of all the others whose contribution to the common defense may be 
needed.,,2 At the heart of collective security theory is the assumption that war and conflict are 
endemic within the international system of states; without war or at least the threat of violence 
the need to deter would-be aggressors is essentially eliminated along with the need for a system 
of collective security. This assumption certainly rings true if one were to consider the seemingly 
2 Inis L. Claude, The Rejection of Collective Security (University Press of America, 1986), p. 51. 
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endless number of micro wars in Africa alone. Furthermore, collective security assumes that 
states wish to maintain the status quo; that is, aggression (for whatever reason) is impermissible. 
From this perspective, the aggressor is automatically the "bad guy." There is no place for 
neutrality or for those who may believe that aggression is, in some instances, necessary to ensure 
justice. 
a. The International System is Composed of Aggressor and Peaceful States 
This leads to yet another assumption that holds that under a system of collective security 
the world can be neatly divided into aggressor states and peaceful states. Stemming from this 
assumption is the notion that states will be able to agree on what constitutes aggression and will 
be willing to respond to any aggression anywhere regardless of alliances, treaties or customs. 
Yet, the reality within the consultations and meetings of the Security Council precludes the 
existence of any general consensus and ultimately flies in the face of collective security theory. 
The preponderance of power afforded the P5, in addition to the veto, thus ensure meager 
opportunities to build said consensus. 
h. States will Behave in "Unnatural" Ways 
Moreover, collective security essentially requires states to behave in a way in which they 
have never behaved. Thus, it is implied that states will and do behave, under normal 
circumstances, in ways that are likely to counter the fulfillment of collective security. The 
question then emerges: why do states act in a manner that undermines international peace? 
Acting in accordance with the theory would surely promote a stable international system. The 
answer to that question may be found in the fact that the theory of collective security stacks 
enormous obligations upon the states who subscribe to it. 
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c. Collective Security Strips a State of the Free Will to Judge the Aggressive Acts of 
Other States 
Indeed, in order for collective security to operate effectively as a tool in the international 
system those states that subscribe to the theory of collective security must be willing to back up 
the threat of force with the actual use of force. Moreover, "all aggressors have to be treated the 
same. All threats to and breaches of the peace have to be firmly and automatically opposed.,,3 
Based on this argument states are expected to commit to the opposition of aggression in all 
instances regardless of the circumstances surrounding the conflict. Therein lies the first crippling 
aspect of the theory of collective security: it assumes that states will always have the capacity 
and furthermore the will to act automatically in opposition to any form of aggression on the 
international stage. The theory of collective security does not allow states to make choices about 
which instances of aggression to oppose and which to support or respond to neutrally. It allows 
states no independent assessment of the situation and no autonomous judgment regarding the 
legitimacy of the claim of the aggressive state. 
Claude has elaborated on this concept by arguing that, within the UN collective security 
arrangements, there appears to be a "lack of moral self-confidence.,,4 What Claude intends to 
imply here is that collective security takes for granted the fact that states are willing to defend the 
international system, thus preserving the status quo as mentioned earlier. The issue here arises 
when states do not view the current state of affairs to be worth defending. In just such a case, a 
3 Thomas G. Weiss, et ai, The Theory of UN Collective Security (Westview Press, 2007), p. 5. 
4 Claude, The Rejection OJ, p.GO. 
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state will rather opt to allow the aggression to continue in the hope of establishing some better 
position within the international "pecking order" when the dust settles. 
What of a state's national interests, though? Collective security fails completely if only a 
few member states refuse to act based on what they perceive as their national self-interests. 
Thomas Weiss has argued, "States have numerous narrow national interests that they are 
reluctant to see overridden in the name of peace or justice. They therefore tend to defect from 
inconvenient collective security efforts."s It seems, then, that operational collective security is a 
"zero-sum game" of sorts; refusal by a few ultimately leads to the paralysis of the many. 
d. The Status Quo is Always Preferable to Aggression and Must be Defended 
The notion that states wish to maintain the status quo of the international system has 
received much scholarly attention. This view essentially flies in the face of the realities of 
international politics of the last sixty years. It upholds the idea that collective security requires 
states to block the legitimate acts of sovereign states when those acts seek to change the status 
quo in order to ensure justice. History has shown that states can be aggressive, whether the 
conflict is over scarce resources, territorial claims, perceived threats, or simply national honor. 
States will - and do - go to war regularly to bring about, in their view, justice. In fact, 
according to the United Nations website, in the years ranging from 1948 to 2009, there have been 
more than 60 UN peacekeeping operations in warring and collapsing states with at least 15 of 
those operations categorized as ongoing in regions ranging from southwest Asia to central 
Africa.6 Additionally, conservative estimates count approximately 50 traditional inter-state wars 
(excluding internal or civil wars) during that same time frame. The fact of the matter is that 
5 Ibid., p. 6. 
6 United Nations Peacekeeping. The United Nations, n.d. Web. 28 November 2009. 
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states go to war for a variety of reasons. Collective security thus demands the complete divorce 
of aggression from the proverbial "tool-box" of international politics. 
e. States Will Agree on What Constitutes Aggression 
Another assumption behind the collective security theory requires examination: the 
notion that aggression, itself, can be concretely and unanimously defined by the states of the 
international system. Who is to say what specifically constitutes an act of aggression by one 
state against another? Under the collective security scheme, the UN community is expected to 
act in a single, massive stroke to put down all aggressive states. By implication, then, it seems 
that collective security views the issue of defining aggression as clear and noncontroversial. 
While the UN Charter offers a definition of aggression, scholars have continued to argue the 
meaning of particular terms and debate how certain phrases are to be interpreted. In order for an 
act to be considered "aggression" must it involve the use of military force, e.g. - invasion? In 
fact, the literature points to a grey area between acts clearly defined as aggression, e.g.-invasion, 
and acts that perhaps do not include the use of military force, e.g.- economic sanctions. Does the 
theory require only that a majority of states agree that a particular instance is aggression, and 
those who subscribe to another view must shut up and support the collective security action? 
States have generally been unwilling to fall in line. Collective security theory paints a rosy 
picture with states "coloring inside the lines" as it were, when in reality states tend to "color" 
where they want and when they want as afforded by their national preferences, perspectives, 
interests, and allies. Pinning down a concrete definition of aggression in an ever-evolving 
-8-
Davis 
international system thus poses an enonnous obstacle to the fulfillment of collective security and 
has marred numerous Security Council attempts to implement a stable collective security regime. 
Most scholars tend to agree that collective security looks great on paper: powerful states 
at the head of the Security Council will take the lead and, with the aid of the other member 
states, will come to the aid of the weak. Indeed, the international community will band together 
and stand in solidarity against the injustice of any and all aggression and blood-shed thus saving 
the lives of millions of potential casualties in future wars. Yet the reality of the obligations 
collective security places on states, and the complex nature of international politics find 
collective security frequently abandoned for more convenient, pragmatic, or rational (from the 
perspective of various states) courses of action. 
B. Collective Security and its Three Requirements: Consensus, Commitment, and 
Organization 
Thomas Weiss has said that "successful collective security operations much depend upon 
three central factors: consensus, commitment, and organization.,,7 The first of these factors 
stands out as perhaps the most crippling obstacle in many attempts to use collective security. 
Here, consensus refers to the recognition by members that a threat to international peace and 
security exists.8 If states are unable to succeed in reaching that consensus, the collective security 
process is rendered impotent. Efforts to reach consensus in the United Nations, undoubtedly the 
world's largest international organization constituting 192 member states, have failed repeatedly. 
Within several Security Council resolutions regarding the genocide in Rwanda (although this is 
7 Weiss, Theory of UN, p. 7. 
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
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not an example of inter-state conflict), the representatives of member states fell into complex 
arguments regarding whether the actions of the government in Rwanda constituted genocide.9 
Ultimately, the international community (under the auspices of the UN Security Council), 
at least in Rwanda's case, did reach a consensus of sorts: the potential costs of a commitment to 
intervene, the states conceded, far outweighed the rather abstract benefits of trying to maintain 
peace -- and ultimately justice -- abroad. Furthermore, the Rwanda genocide provided a blatant 
example of states agreeing to refrain from intervention because the victims of aggression, in this 
case, were simply not important enough to gain sympathy and response from the UN community. 
Collective security, then, assumes that states will respond in the same way to an attack on 
Germany or Spain as to an attack with a country such as Togo, the Sudan, or Somalia. 10 In fact, 
however, a certain "pecking order" if you will, based on power, economic resources, and prestige 
shapes the kinds of responses that the UN ultimately delivers. States tend to ignore and refuse 
to defend individuals in a state that plays little-to-no significant role in the international 
community and would ultimately burden the UN member states with very high financial and 
political costs if they were to act. Such marginal states and the factions within them are often 
expected to maintain and defend their own interests free of interference from the UN community. 
This is most strikingly evident in the war-tom history of many African states. It is, ultimately, as 
Charles Darwin once penned it: survival of the fittest. States established neither the consensus 
nor the commitment necessary to intervene. 
The reality of what the theory of collective security demands often results in a rather 
abrupt about-face for states making decisions on international policy. It is not that states refuse 
9 The nature of the arguments resulted in language within Security Council resolutions 912,918, and 929 that 
touched on the systematic slaughter of a speCific ethnic group without ever using the term - genocide. 
10 Ibid., p. 6. 
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to obey the laws against aggression, but rather that states reject the duty to uphold that law [and 
balk at the notion of being policemen.] II As Inis Claude argues, "the hardness of approach 
makes them [states] play with the idea of collective security ... [it is] an artificial mood.,,12 By 
utilizing the soft approach to international politics states hope to avoid needless and protracted 
wars. Collective security, however, demands a steadfast commitment to the hard line approach 
and disregards the natural tendency of states towards soft measures in coping with conflict 
abroad. Claude sums this notion up: "Commitment to the repression of aggression is far more 
attractive as an abstract principle than as a working policy.,,13 States have generally remained 
unwilling to organize and act together when their theory is tested. Through the course of its 
peacekeeping operations over the past 60 years, the Security Council has come to understand 
precisely Claude's insightful perspective. 
C. Collective Security as an Aggressive (War) Approach 
The very instrument upon which collective security relies for the defense of order is 
the same as that which disrupts order in the first place: military force. 14 States thus face 
accusations, when responding to aggression with force, that their actions are no less ignoble than 
those of the original belligerent. As a result of these perennial accusations, states must have the 
moral confidence to commit fully and wholly to collective security, even when it creates further 
violence and additional forms of aggression. This returns us to the three criteria necessary for 
peacekeeping operations: consensus, commitment, and organization. Without solid commitment 
to the purpose at hand by the participating states, an operation will end before it has the chance 
11 Claude, p. 54. 
12 Ibid., p. 57. 
13 Ibid., p. 59. 
14 Ibid., p. 62. 
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to begin. Yet again collective security demands far more from the international community than 
it is willing to concede. States clearly have a tendency of lacking said confidence in every policy 
they undertake to implement, and yet collective security demands that states act otherwise. 
D. Collective Security has its Successes 
In two instances since 1947 collective security has proven to be an effective policy: the 
1991 Persian Gulf War which saw the rollback of Iraqi troops from bordering Kuwait, and a 
military coup in Haiti which saw its operations cut short by a UN Coalition Task Force. And, in 
both instances the number of states that actually participated in the UN multinational force 
constituted far less than a quarter of the member states available. This is to say that the 
perception of legitimacy conferred on forceful actions taken under Chapter VII is directly 
proportional to the scope of participation therein. Moreover, these two instances prove to be 
exceptional cases to the norm of "every state for itself' and illustrate that while it is possible to 
succeed, the complexities and dynamics of the international community eventually see the theory 
of collective security mired in symbolic political gesturing rather than its swift and effective 
application. "If states were able to act as collective security requires them ... the international 
system would be harmonious, not conflictual. In that case ... collective security would rarely be 
needed." In theory that statement bears out; assuming collective security truly were the norm 
and potential aggressors knew beyond any doubt that action on their part would be met 
automatically with the use of swift, heavy-handed, collective force by the international 
community, those would-be aggressors would see no benefit in attempting to disrupt the 
international order. As a result, the actual use of force in the name of collective security would 
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dwindle thus allowing a stable international system to flourish and releasing the Security Council 
of the responsibility of countless operations across the globe. 
There is nothing negative in hoping for a more peaceful and stable international system; 
yet, to ignore the reality of how states operate and the motivating factors that lead to acting in 
such a way is nothing short of ill-advised. As Thomas Weiss concludes, "World politics often 
[make] it impossible to act collectively, and states often choose to disobey or ignore the 
prohibitions and restrictions on the use of force to pursue raisons d'etat.,,15 Likewise, lnis 
Claude has concluded that collective security's great weakness "is that it makes demands upon 
international civic virtue that cannot be met ... neither the political elites nor the ordinary people 
who constitute the states of the world are prepared to accept the obligations of a collective 
security system." 16 
III. Peacekeeping: An Alternative to Collective Security 
With the sun setting on the theory and practice of collective security, and the rise in 
instances of collapsing states, peacekeeping emerged as a popular alternative in the 1980s and 
1990s in an attempt to grapple with this emerging trend in the international community. Because 
collective security had largely failed in every major attempt at its utilization, the UN turned to 
the idea of peacekeeping. Broadly defined, peacekeeping abstains from the use of force. Rather, 
it is designed to bring about a peaceful resolution in a conflict by interposing neutral 
peacekeepers between the belligerents. Key aspects of this approach to conflict resolution 
inherently undermine the very goal which it seeks to attain: peace. Before peacekeepers can take 
a single step within a state, they must first be granted permission to do so by that state's 
15 Weiss, Theory of UN, p. 23 
16 Claude, The Rejection of, p. 66-67. 
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government. Furthermore, all parties to the conflict must agree to the presence of the 
peacekeeping force. If said agreement is withheld, the peacekeeping force has no authority to 
enter the state unless the Security Council proceeds under Article VII of the UN Charter, which 
stipulates that the conflict represents a threat to international peace and security. Peacekeeping 
relies on the willingness of belligerents to come to the table. Although it does not involve the use 
of force to achieve its aims, peacekeeping provides an open forum in which warring parties may 
agree to a cessation of hostilities in the pursuit of a more lasting peace resolution. Yet, 
peacekeeping has confronted many of the same obstacles as its predecessor: collective security. 
Lack of consensus between belligerents as well as within the international community, lack of 
commitment by contributing member states to stay involved in a region for the long haul, and 
lack of organization within the mandates and operations themselves all culminate to place 
peacekeeping at a distinct disadvantage. 
A. Rwanda . .. A Failed Attempt at Peacekeeping 
Owing to the lack of an international civic virtue as described by Claude there have been 
a series of botched Security Council peacekeeping operations in recent years. Of those 
operations, Rwanda offers clear and alarming insights as to the institutional paralysis that has so 
frequently strangled the UN and its Security Council leadership. On April 6th, 1994, a plane 
carrying the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents was shot down. The two leaders had just 
concluded a visit to Tanzania during which they had signed the Arusha Peace Agreement. 
Shortly after the assassination of both leaders, the Presidential Guard, the Rwandan armed forces 
(FAR), and extremist militias (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi) set up roadblocks throughout 
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Rwanda and began the organized slaughter of nearly one million Rwandans. 1718 Chief among 
the issues faced by the Security Council was the tendency of member states to allow their 
discussions to become bogged down in the technical or legal definitions of words like "civil 
war," "genocide," and "sovereignty" in the early stages of the crisis. Here again, lack of 
consensus among the member states of the Security Council plays a significant role in the events 
which follow soon after. As a result of this "tunnel vision," the Security Council lost sight of its 
primary objective in international politics: the maintenance of peace and the protection of 
hundreds of thousands of lives. To be sure, members of the Council (particularly the P5) 
understood that to label the events playing out in Rwanda as genocide inherently carried the 
additional weight of a moral obligation to act. Indeed, international legal scholars widely agreed 
that the 1948 UN Genocide Convention would have added a legal obligation for the Security 
Council to act if the actions in Rwanda were determined to be genocide. 
While the Security Council wrestled with semantics, other officials within the UN made 
clear their understanding of the situation. Under-Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari stated 
unequivocally that, in his opinion, "all the facts that were necessary to make judgments were 
fairly well known ... they [P5] were not prepared to take the necessary steps.,,19 Owing to this, 
the P5 demonstrated, with excruciating clarity, that Rwanda was not a high priority state in the 
grand scheme of world politics. Moreover, this debacle sent a message to the international 
17 The exact number of casualties has never truly been verified and conflicting reports range from 800,000 to 
around 1,000,000. 
18 Ferroggiaro, W. (2001). The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994:Evidence of Inaction. Retrieved April 10, 
2008, from The National Security Archive 
19 Piiparinen, T. (2006). Beyond the Mystery ofthe Rwanda 'Black Box': Political Will and Early Warning. 
International Peacekeeping, 13 (3), 334-347. 
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community that the Security Council would seriously consider action only in matters that were 
viewed to be of significant strategic or economic significance for the P5. Strangely, although the 
Council was unwilling to act throughout the 100 days of genocide it remained actively seized of 
the matter which prevented the General Assembly from utilizing the "Uniting for Peace" clause 
to supersede the Council. Indeed, had the Council disengaged from the conflict once it became 
apparent no purposive action would be taken, the General Assembly would have been authorized 
to act thus rendering the Council impervious to international criticism. 
Beginning in October of 1993, the Security Council passed resolution # 872 which 
established the United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (hereinafter UNAMIR) a full 
seven months before the full-scale genocide began. The mandate approved by the Council 
granted UNAMIR the responsibility and authority only to observe and monitor Rwanda's 
transition from a 20-year dictatorship, to a power-sharing democracy as agreed upon in the 
Arusha Peace Agreement.2o To that point, the Security Council had been examining the situation 
from the context of an internal civil war, which had been initiated in 1990 between the 
government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front.21 It was in that context that the Security 
Council concluded that no duty to intervene in the mass killings existed. 
It is important to note that on the date of the attack on the presidential flight, there were 
approximately 2,539 UNAMIR troops in the Rwandan capital of Kigali, yet the UN operation 
was sluggish, under-prepared for the situation on the ground, and under-funded; UNAMIR's 
mandate fell far short of what the Arusha Accords called for.22 In that agreement it was stated 
20 Melvern, L. (2006). Rwanda and Darfur: The Media and the Security Council. International Relations, 20, 93. 
21 Melvern, 93. 
22 Lyon, A. (2005). Beyond Rwanda and Kosovo: The Interactive DynamiCS of International Peacekeeping and Ethnic 
Mobilisation. Global SOCiety, 19(3), 267-288. 
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the UN would guarantee overall security ... assist in the tracking of arms caches and 
neutralization of anned gangs throughout the country ... [and] assist in the recovery of all 
weapons distributed to, or illegally acquired by, the civilians. Clearly there was a severe 
disconnection between the goals envisioned by the UN and the level of commitment the Security 
Council states were willing to proffer. 
During the genocide, the UN Force Commander, General Dallaire, repeatedly beseeched 
the UN DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) to broaden the scope ofUNAMIR's 
mandate in order to allow his force of UN peacekeepers to pursue the numerous documented 
anns caches which were being utilized by roving death squads.23 This was a reasonable request 
given the responsibilities detailed under the Arusha Agreement and the ever-growing consensus 
among ground personnel that they were witnessing the largest and most efficient wave of 
genocide since the Nazi extermination of Jews during World War Two. Yet, each time General 
Dallaire proposed to take proactive steps he was, with unaccustomed speed, told by the DPKO to 
stand down unless expressly permitted by the mandate ofUNAMIR.24 
For the purposes of illustrating the lack of will within the Security Council, this excerpt, 
taken from Security Council Resolution # 918 on May 17th, 1994 several weeks after the 
genocide began and after the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, illustrates the paralysis: 
23 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: In accordance with the purposes and principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is dedicated 
to assisting the Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and 
security. The Department's mission is to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so that 
they can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, 
and under the command vested in the Secretary-General. Retrieved on April 15th, 2008, from the United Nations 
Web site: http://www.un.orgJDepts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm 




expressing once again its alarm at the continued report of systematic, widespread and flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other violations ofthe rights 
to life and property, demands that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to 
a cease-fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda (emphasis 
added)?5 
The killing often Belgian UN peacekeepers on April 7th, 1994 indicated that strong 
intervention in Rwanda could potentially lead to another Somalia which would further collapse 
UN credibility abroad.26 This directly resulted in the only and perhaps most damaging action 
taken by the UN: Security Council Resolution # 912. Within this resolution it was decided that 
the bulk ofUNAMIR peacekeeping forces would be pulled out of operations, leaving only a 
token force of some 450 peacekeepers and military personnel. In an attempt to detract from any 
bad press which would result from this decision, the Security Council sent Human Rights 
Monitors to Rwanda to show the international community that they were concerned with the 
situation and were still willing to put somebody - anybody - on the ground. 
It is important to note that collective security was meant to be used only for battles and 
conflicts between states. Rwanda was an internal issue centered on a civil war - historically not 
the type of conflict that the UN would get involved in owing to the fact that it represents a 
violation of the Charter unless taken under Article VII. As mentioned previously, in order for 
peacekeepers to go in, there had to be some sort of ceasefire or expressed agreement on the part 
of all sides that UN peacekeepers come in. And although the peacekeepers were ultimately 
25 (1994). Resolution # 918. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from United Nations 
Web site : http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/218/36/PDF/N9421836.pdf?OpenElement 
26 The incident mentioned involved a small contingent of Belgian Peacekeepers assigned to protect Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu, who was named Minister of Education. When she proposed ending the quota 
system that restricted Tutsi access to higher education, she was attacked in her home by twenty armed men. She 
and her Belgian bodyguards were slaughtered. Belgium would promptly recall its contingent of troops as a result 
of this attack. 
-18-
Davis 
allowed to enter Rwanda, the warring factions had no intent to halt their activities to abide by 
UN protocols. 
The representatives appeared positively baffled because the fighting in Rwanda would 
not stop, even after the above statement. And, of course, it only got worse once the UN 
withdrew what was already a severely handicapped peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, the 
fact that the Security Council felt their "demands" and sense of "alarm" actually had bearing on 
the events playing out in Rwanda only further illustrates how aloof the Council had become in its 
appraisal of the situation. Moreover, when they [Hutu militias] saw they could get away with 
that kind of violence in Kigali with no reaction from the UN troops stationed there, it encouraged 
them to go ahead and expand their operations secure in the knowledge that the UN [and more 
specifically the SC] could do, or rather, would do, absolutely nothing.27 
The Security Council defended its actions and protocols in handling the Rwandan 
genocide by stating that the situation was beyond the point of effective proactive intervention. 
Yet there were, at the peak ofUNAMIR deployment, 2,539 troops available in addition to some 
1,550 Belgian, French, and u.S. troops stationed in nearby African countries. This combined 
troop strength, had it been properly mandated, outfitted, and funded could have easily confronted 
the poorly armed Hutu militias, whose primary weapons consisted of machetes. 
The failure of the Security Council and the UN in this operation was the result ofa 
myriad of problems. The ever-recurring theme of a general lack of consensus, commitment, and 
organization insured that the genocide would continue unabated. States failed to form a 
consensus on how to categorize the events taking place in Rwanda, failed to maintain their 
27 Lyon, 276. 
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commitment to keeping peacekeepers on the ground, and failed to properly organize and 
mandate the operation which was eventually undertaken by UN peacekeepers. A primary factor 
that led to the failure was the emergence of a chain reaction which started with very poor 
reporting from the field by UNAMIR observers. This was owed to the fact that UNAMIR forces 
were restricted to the capital city of Kigali, and therefore lacked the resources and mandate to 
observe the planning, preparation, and implementation of the nation-wide killing campaign.28 
Not only was the force under-trained and under-equipped, it was both geographically and 
politically restrained from the very actions which were necessary to fulfill the responsibilities 
under the Arusha Peace Agreement. Continuing down the chain reaction, the poor reporting 
from the field led the Secretariat to underestimate the sheer scope of the killing in the early 
phases of the genocide. It was generally assumed that the situation on the ground couldn't be 
that dire and, if it were, it would quickly be detected by the agencies employed by the permanent 
members of the Security Council. 
Furthermore the Secretariat, with flawed intelligence and numerous conflicting reports in 
hand, would deliver its briefing to the Security Council along with recommendations on the 
situation thus leading the non-permanent members, without their own intelligence-gathering 
capabilities, to fully rely upon the information that was provided to them. It is clear to see that 
although the Security Council functioned within the established norms and protocols of 
international law, it was unable to fulfill its responsibility to the international community. 
Beleaguered and cumbersome, the Security Council made a faint gesture to stop the killings for 
the purposes of perception on the international stage. Yet, this statement must be tempered with 
a consideration for the fact that the Council never truly occupied a position from which it could 
28 Piiparinen, 11. 
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actively take control of the situation. As noted earlier, the Council required either a ceasefire to 
take effect or the approval of the sitting government before it could take any form of action on 
the matter. By selecting the peacekeeping approach to conflict resolution as its tool of choice, 
the Security Council unintentionally tied its own hands with the regulations of the UN Charter 
and the customs of international law. Fearful of the potential costs associated with following 
through on their annual battle cry of "Never Again," the Security Council withdrew 
peacekeeping forces and continued to demand a cease to all hostilities through a grand total of 
twelve resolutions dating from October of 1993 to November of 1994. What was staggering, 
aside from the efficiency with which the Hutu genocidal plan came into effect, in regard to the 
UN personnel, is that such a huge collection of capable, intelligent people, from dozens of 
different countries being paid quite enormous salaries, could collectively get it so wrong?9 
Indeed, although it can be argued the Council did not fully perform its duty in the case of 
Rwanda, it is crucial to remember that the dispute was of domestic origin and was not conducive 
to a peacekeeping operation. It ultimately fell beyond the jurisdiction of the Council as 
articulated in the UN Charter. 
B. Bosnia: Peacekeeping Misses the Mark 
Important parallels exist between the factors that led to the inability or unwillingness of 
the international community to respond to the genocide in Rwanda and those that led to the 
extended Yugoslav war. As James Gow states, "there can be no doubt that the handling of the 
Yugoslav war was uneven and did not produce either immediate or complete success.,,30 The 
conflict in Bosnia is generally clustered with the conflicts of Slovenia and Croatia as part of one 
29 Totten, 7. 
30 Gow, J. (1997). Triumph of the Lack of Will, New York: Columbia University Press. Pg 3. 
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war originating with the dissolution of the Yugoslav state.3l The end of the Cold War saw the 
proliferation of states as ethnic minorities broke away from their states and sought national self-
determination and sovereign status. Such fragmentation triggered state responses that often led to 
war across the globe. Indeed, as Elinor Sloan has posited, the rise of ethnic nationalism, as seen 
in the relations between ethnic Albanians and Serb and Muslim minorities, ultimately ignited the 
Yugoslav powder keg. Indeed, in response to the fierce nationalism with which Slobodan 
Milosevic had galvanized Serbia, Croatia responded by electing an equally nationalist President 
Franjo Tudjman. Bosnia thus found itself attempting to establish a camp somewhere in the 
proverbial "middle ground" between Serbia on one side and Slovenia and Croatia on the other.32 
In the course of events that ensued, the recognition by the international community of Slovenia 
and Croatia's independence thus set the Serbs and the Muslims on a collision course in Bosnia.33 
After the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government declared independence on April 2, 1992, and 
the international community recognized Bosnia four days later, compounding tensions exploded 
into civil war.34 
The Security Council began to take action against Serbia as it became increasingly 
apparent the Serbian leadership was primarily responsible for the violence that had erupted in 
Bosnia. Security Council Resolution 743 demanded the complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav 
army from Bosnia; yet, the Serbian leaders ignored the resolution and created a new Yugoslav 
Federation with Montenegro. This new federation continued to provide support to the Army of 
the Serbian Republic (VRS), which consisted almost entirely of Bosnian Serbs. As a result, the 
Security Council opted to impose economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro with UNSCR 
31 Ibid., Pg. 4. 
32 Sloan, Elinor C. (1998). Bosnia and the New Collective Security. Westport: Praeger. Pg. 12. 
33 Ibid., Pg. 16. 
34 Ibid., Pg. 16. 
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757. It is important to note that a UN peacekeeping force had previously been deployed in 
Croatia (UNPROFOR) and had been subsequently expanded to address the escalation of 
hostilities in Bosnia. Yet, the Security Council fell victim to the same broad lack of consensus 
and general risk aversion which would come to haunt and doom the peacekeeping operations in 
Bosnia and later in Rwanda. This fact is borne out in light of the Security Council's decision to 
expand UNPROFOR into Bosnia and yet limit its mandate to the Sarajevo airport. Once again, 
squabbling within the international community concerning the use of force to address the 
"Bosnian question" retarded and hindered the effective implementation of collective 
international pressure. Various members of the Security Council simply did not view the conflict 
in the same light. Indeed, neither China nor Russia supported peacekeeping of any kind on this 
particular matter. 
UNPROFOR experienced a plethora of issues which prevented the effective 
implementation of its UNSC mandate. First, UN peacekeeping requires an invitation by the 
acting government or an agreement that the warring parties accept its presence. Yet, 
humanitarian aid convoys were routinely blocked by Bosnian Serb forces, confidant that UN 
peacekeepers lacked the necessary resources to push the convoys through. The addition of the 
'Safe-Haven' mandate to UNPROFOR's original mandate served only to exacerbate existing 
incapacities for the UN presence in Bosnia. Indeed, Sloan states, 
"The problems with the safe-haven mandate were similar to those of the 
humanitarian aid mandate, but even more pronounced. First, UNPROFOR's safe-
haven mandate and rules of engagement were incompatible with its resources. 
The commander ofUNPROFOR had estimated that in order to ensure full respect 
for the safe areas, the force would need approximately 34,000 additional troops to 
obtain deterrence through strength" (Pg. 29). 
-23-
Davis 
In contrast to the sizeable appraisal by the UNPROFOR commander, the Security Council 
approved a token force of7,500 troops in UNSCR 844. However, even this number was difficult 
to procure from contributing states owing to the general deterioration of the situation on the 
ground. By designating cities such as Srebrenica, Sarajevo, and Gorazde as 'safe-havens' for 
Bosnian refugees, it was hoped that the warring parties would continue to view UN action as 
impartial. Failure to provide adequate heavy weaponry to deter attacks by Bosnian Serb forces 
further served to illustrate the growing gap between UN objectives in the region and the 
international will to see those objectives met. Although the Security Council made repeated 
gestures to bring the atrocities in Bosnia to a halt, conflict and dissention within the UN bodies 
regarding the authorized use of force in addition to competing NATO and U.S. interests in the 
conflict resulted in a slow, disjointed, and incremental response that ultimately failed to protect 
the citizens of Bosnia. Yet again blame cannot be placed squarely on the shoulders of the 
Security Council. The fact of the matter was that few states wanted to get involved in this 
internal issue as it would require huge sacrifice on their part. Furthermore, the warring parties in 
Bosnia did not want them [peacekeepers or the UN in any form] there and would not support 
them. And as states took different sides in the conflict, the possibility of creating consensus to 
jointly address the situation quickly eroded. Thus, the foray into Bosnia represents more of a 
failure of the UN generally than the complete failure of the Security Council alone. 
c. Somalia: Another Lesson in Peacekeeping 
The specter of the Somali UN peacekeeping operations still lingers within the collective 
memory of the Security Council. To quote a UN publication on Somalia: "mounted in 1992 in 
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conditions of exceptional complexity, in a country where all organs of government had 
collapsed, the operation in Somalia was called upon to deal with a devastating famine and a 
brutal multi-sided civil war which, collectively, claimed the lives of at least 300,000 people.,,35 
As with any conflict, the Council could not arbitrarily send peacekeepers into Somalia without 
either an invitation by the acting government or the agreement of the warring parties; yet under 
Article VII of the UN Charter, the Council could legitimately authorize the forceful insertion of 
peacekeeping forces if the conflict was viewed to be a threat to international peace and security. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, political, economic and social conditions began to degrade 
the stability of the national government in addition to societal institutions. The descent of the 
nation into civil war in 1988 saw the upheaval of 500,000 people and the destruction of an 
already feeble economy which only compounded growing food shortages throughout that state. 
Rival interests between Siad Barre's government in Mogadishu and a growing number of smaller 
alliances such as the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and the Somali National Movement (SNM) 
ultimately led to a state of emergency with Siad Barre fleeing the capitol. This resulted in large 
weapons caches falling into the hands of varied rival movements. "Throughout 1991, Somalia 
was tom apart by battles among the factions' militias and by widespread looting and banditry. 
With no central Government, the country fragmented, as rival militias seized or fought over 
different regions and towns.,,36 In addition to the ever-expanding hostilities, widespread famine 
also came to grip Somalia and its inhabitants as many of the population's farmers were forced to 
flee their lands. The combination of these factors created what was, to that point, the most 
35 No author. The United Nations and Somalia: 1992-1996. New York: Department of Public Information. Pg. 3. 
36 Ibid., Pg. 12 
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sophisticated and complex international humanitarian crisis the Security Council and the UN had 
ever grappled with. 
On 24 April 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 751 which 
authorized the creation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1).37 Within this 
resolution it was mandated that 50 military observers would be deployed to monitor a tentative 
cessation of hostilities in addition to a small contingent of lightly armed peacekeepers to protect 
humanitarian relief efforts. It is important to note that while UNOSOM I was partially able to 
relieve the suffering of famine and disease, there remained significant obstacles to its full 
implementation. To quote a UN publication, "UNOSOM I was conceived as a peacekeeping 
mission. Peacekeeping, in contrast with peace enforcement, is not intended to achieve its 
objectives through the use of force. When peacekeepers are deployed, they make every effort, 
by peaceful persuasion, to stop the fighting between warring parties or to carry out other aspects 
of their mandates; they do not force belligerents to cease their hostilities.,,38 Indeed, the 
publication goes further when it states that peacekeeping operations can succeed only when the 
parties to the conflict wish to avoid hostilities. When rivals are intent on making war, the 
potential effectiveness of peacekeeping can be undermined.39 
In its efforts to maintain international peace, the Security Council often has a broad array 
of tools in the proverbial "tool box" of international relations. Whether an operation sanctioned 
by the Council succeeds often depends on the tool used. Selecting from the advantages and 
37 UNOSOM is typically differentiated from the later, expanded and more broadly mandated operation of UNOSOM 
II 
38 Ibid., Pg. 24 
39 Ibid., Pg. 24 [emphasis added] 
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disadvantages offered by peacekeeping, peace building, or peace enforcement thus determines 
the course of events for a particular operation. 
To clarify, peace building involves the additional creation of, and support for, institutions 
that allow for the peaceful resolution of future conflicts. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali defined peace building as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" in his Agenda/or Peace.40 
Contrary to this, peace enforcement involves the use of armed force to separate combatants and 
to create a cease-fire that did not previously exist independent of outside intervention.4! 
Operations charged with a peace enforcement mandate thus do not require the consent of the 
belligerents or the national government to forcefully take action within a given state. 
Because of the growing frustration of the humanitarian effort in Somalia, the Security 
Council reconvened to examine a new option for the region: the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) 
led by the U.S. Under resolution 794 the Council determined that the conflict in Somalia did 
indeed constitute a threat to international peace and security and decided that action under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations.42 As a UN publication states, 
"It is clear that UNIT AF was conceived as a temporary exercise in peace 
enforcement. However, events in Somalia in the first months of 1993 made it 
increasingly clear that the follow-up mission would also need the authority to use 
force. The Security Council thus established UNOSOM II as the first peace 
enforcement operation explicitly authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter that 
was both organized and commanded by the UN.,,43 
40 http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html. Accessed March 1, 2010. 
41 http://www.globalsecurity.org!military/library/report/call/call_93-8_chap3.htm Accessed March 10, 2010. 
42 Ibid., Pg. 32 
43 Ibid., Pg. 40 
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The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II saw the expansion of the original UNOSOM 
mandate to a peace enforcement operation. However, a botched U.S. raid on a suspected 
meeting between USC/SNA militia leaders resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers, the capture 
of one U.S. helicopter pilot, and images seen around the world of dead U.S. Army Rangers being 
dragged through the streets of southern Mogadishu. This tragic event led to President Bill 
Clinton's decision to reevaluate the situation in Somalia and the commitment the U.S. was 
willing to continue to make. On October 7, 1993, President Clinton announced that the United 
States would withdraw all its combat forces from Somalia the end of March the following year. 
Here, it is evident that democracy plays a significant role in President Clinton's appraisal of the 
situation. As in any democracy, the political leadership must answer to the voting public for the 
policies and actions their state adopts. Waning public support for a particular action can often 
factor just as heavily in political calculations as a deteriorating situation on the ground where 
forces are committed. 
Owing to this abrupt withdrawal of forces by the U.S., the Security Council saw large 
numbers of its remaining contingent of international troops for UNOSOM II dwindle. Without 
the strength and leadership of the U.S., many states felt far too exposed to the unstable situation 
in Somalia and quickly mirrored the U.S. decision to withdraw. In the absence of the American 
and European contingents warfare soon erupted once again and the Security Council, faced with 
little other option, resolved to terminate the UNOSOM mandate in 1995. To quote the UN 
publication, "the withdrawal ofUNOSOM II marked the end of a major phase of the efforts of 
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the international community to facilitate the search for peace and reconciliation and to deliver 
humanitarian assistance. ,,44 
The Security Council did playa significant role in preventing continued starvation 
throughout Somalia. This particular success can be attributed to the concerted efforts of the 
international community at large. And while there were other small victories for the Council, 
many elements of the operations had committed grossly similar mistakes as seen in the past. The 
Security Council failed, yet again, to provide clear mandates for its operations and, when it did 
manage to do so, failed to provide or ensure the additional means to implement them. 
However, there are also a number of other problems that have nothing to do with the 
Council. First, states are often unwilling to commit to operations in dangerous internal conflicts 
on the other side of the world in a state that represents no strategic interests. Second, states often 
don't agree on whether internal enforcement is warranted at all; thus, lack of consensus beyond 
the Council may have a profound impact on the Council and its operations. Third, warring sides 
don't want peacekeepers in their countries and will attempt to block their entry. Even when 
peacekeepers are eventually allowed to enter a country, the belligerents can opt to keep their 
heads down and wait out the peacekeeping force only to resume the conflict once the 
peacekeepers have left. Fourth, the situations presented to the Council are difficult to alter by 
nature. The complexities of peacekeeping operations stem from the complexities of the conflicts 
themselves; thus, to alter the situation requires a broad understanding of the factors at work and 
the players involved. Small, incremental escalations in Security Council operations abroad 
ostensibly inherit key traits that ultimately contribute to their inevitable failure. It is clear, 
through the examination of these three Security Council operations, that the international 
44 Ibid., Pg. 77 
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community, as embodied by the Council, lacks the sufficient resources and, furthermore, the will 
to commit to extended forays within the borders of collapsing states. A new role for the council 
has thus evolved. 
IV. Rebirth of the Council: Legitimizing State Actions 
It has been shown that the Security Council is widely regarded as a legitimate source of 
authority in the international community. Yet many scholars disagree as to why the Council has 
been the recipient of such widespread, albeit tacit, approval. Cronin and Hurd state that as 
recently as 2003, with the U.S.-led invasion ofIraq, several states sympathetic to the U.S. said 
they would support American action only if it was first approved by the UN Security Council, 
and the U.S. approached the Council seeking to have its preferred policy endorsed.45 It should 
be noted, however, that ultimately the United States proceeded without the Security Council 
approval it so adamantly sought; many scholars argue this example clearly illustrates yet another 
in a long line of failures by the Council to prevent the unilateral use of force. 
I contend, however, the fact the United States expended such a great deal of effort to 
achieve Council approval reinforces this notion of the perceived legitimacy of the Security 
Council. This is only a single recent example of a larger growing trend within the realm of intra-
state actions. The preponderance of authority and legitimacy bestowed upon the Council by no 
means ensures compliance; yet, states continue to act based on the assumed primacy of the 
45 Cronin, Bruce & Hurd, Ian. The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority. Pg. 31. 
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Security Council in matters relating to war and peace. Ultimately, the U.S. moved ahead 
because it believed doing so was the right course. But it would have preferred to have Security 
Council approval. 
lnis Claude has suggested that, "the world organization has come to be regarded and 
used, as a dispenser of politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies, 
and actions of states. ,,46 Indeed, he stipulates further that collective legitimization has emerged 
as one of its [Security Council's] major political functions. The question then emerges: why has 
collective legitimization moved to the forefront of Security Council policy? 
In answering that question, Claude observes that rulers seek legitimization not only to 
satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions. Thus, by providing said 
legitimization, the Security Council acts to fulfill a basic need in the "market" of international 
relations. As a result, rulers (and the states they represent) find themselves adopting a lobbying 
role of sorts in order to ensure that their state does not become the subject of widespread 
international criticism for a particular action or policy. At this point, it is crucial to understand 
the tenn legitimacy as it is used in this section of discourse. Erik Voeten has argued that, "given 
its lack of enforcement capabilities, the SC's leverage resides almost entirely in the perceived 
legitimacy its decisions grant to forceful actions.,,47 Claude promulgates two fundamental 
concepts which figure prominently in the history of political legitimacy: law and morality. To be 
sure, the tenn is based on the notion of legality; yet, moralists tend to treat legitimacy as an issue 
of moral justification. Suffice it to say that while law and morality may reinforce one another in 
46 Claude, I. (1966) Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. International 
Organizations, Vol. 20, No.3, pp. 367-379 
47 Voeten, Erik. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. International 
Organization. Vol. 59, No 3 (Summer, 2005), pp. 527-557 
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one instance, in another they may just as easily conflict. Claude asserts, "the process of 
legitimization is ultimately a political phenomenon, a crystallization of judgment that may be 
influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles.',48 
Claude's assertion meshes well with the political realities oftoday's globalized political 
arena. Although international legal norms and prevailing moral mentalities may figure into 
Council decision making, the Council is by no means a slave to them. Indeed, the record of the 
Security Council is spotty at best when attempting to apply consistently such moral or legalistic 
principles. Often, issues on the Security Council agenda necessitate contradictory decisions 
owing to developments in the ever-evolving realm of regional and international organizations. 
At its core, the Security Council (and more specifically the P5) represents a power 
concert consisting of the world's most powerful and affluent states. Yet, "with its nearly 
universal membership, the UN enjoys an unparalleled comparative advantage in providing a 
forum for achieving the broadest possible international acceptance for state action taken.',49 It is 
important to consider that the Security Council was not conceived with an intrinsic authority to 
legitimize state actions. Rather, as Cronin and Hurd stipulate, ''through ongoing and often 
contentious efforts to deal with discrete problems, the Council has been able to expand its 
authority on a case-by-case basis precisely because the UN membership believed that it was 
following proper procedures in making these decisions. ,,50 Thus, it is through the institutional 
authority of international organizations (lOs) that subsequent decisions may be granted the 
weight of bearing recognized authority. 
48 Claude, pp. 369 
49 
Prantl, J. Informal Groups of States, pp. 565 
50 Cronin, B. & Ian Hurd, The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, pp. 8 
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There is a current trend within international relations whereby states view, with 
increasing significance, the role that international law and the emerging body of trans-national 
law plays in providing the foundation of international legitimization. Owing to its actions and, 
indeed, its very foundation in the expanding body of international law, the Security Council 
occupies a unique position that emphasizes the rule of international law as a reflection of the 
international community's focus on the application of collectively prescribed norms and 
practices. To be sure, Cronin and Hurd state that, "in its declarative, interpretive, promotion, and 
enforcement functions, the Council has shaped international law. Most of these functions are not 
enumerated in the UN Charter and yet have come to be seen as falling within the ambit of its 
authority."Sl With this central focus upon international law comes the inherent notion that states 
acting unilaterally, and forcefully against others, merit reprisal by the Security Council. Indeed, 
the Security Council has adopted countless resolutions condemning various states for a plethora 
of reasons ultimately tied to the reasons enumerated above. This supports the claim made by Inis 
Claude that, "for whatever reasons of whatever validity, statesmen exhibit a definite preference 
for a political rather than a legal process oflegitimization."s2 Ifpurely legal legitimization were 
preferred, this thesis would be examining the International Court of Justice rather than the 
Security Council. 
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan once shrewdly observed 
that, "when states decide to use force ... there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided 
by the United Nations Security Council."s3 Many scholars have come to believe that this unique 
legitimacy springs from the sociological aspect of international authority; in other words, 
"authority exists when actors believe that a rule or hierarchy is legitimate and thereby it 
51 Cronin & Hurd, pp. 82 
52 
Claude, pp. 84 
53 Cronin & Hurd, pp. 31 
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contributes to their perceptions of their interests.,,54 Thus, the Council is only able to fulfill its 
role of legitimizing state action if the actors within the international community buy into the 
perception that they need external political reassurance. Moreover, Voeten asserts that this idea 
contrasts with the conception that legitimacy properly signifies an evaluation on normative 
grounds. In this view, if an institution fails to meet a set of specified standards it is illegitimate, 
regardless of how individual actors perceive the institution.,,55 In support of this notion, Cronin 
and Hurd contend that, "there is indeed a great deal of effort by the states at the Council to justify 
their positions in international law ... [and that] it would seem to signal that actors see some 
advantage from finding support at the Council for their policies.,,56 Owing to this, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the Security Council truly has taken up the mantle of collectively 
legitimizing state actions; for, if states did not value such legitimization they would not seek to 
justify their actions. Consider, for example, the increasing number of states that have adopted 
laws pertaining to participation in UN military operations. States such as Japan and India have 
made it clear that troop contributions will be proffered only once Security Council approval is 
first granted. Erik V oeten claims that this suggests that Security Council approval may facilitate 
foreign leaders to participate in military actions [albeit in a reserved fashion].57 
The increased significance of Security Council approval underscores what Claude 
describes as the growing trend for international political organizations to be conferred with the 
function of legitimization. 58 Yet, as Cronin and Hurd assert, ''to maintain its authority, the 
Council needs to engage in a trade-off: it must maintain some meaningful level of restraint on 
unilateral uses of force by the powerful while preserving the incentives for cooperation from 
54 Ibid, pp. 27 
55 Voeten, pp. 534 
56 Ibid, pp. 35 
57 Voeten, pp. 532 
58 
Claude, pp. 83 
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those same powerful states, especially the U.S."S9 Indeed, to some scholars, this reinterpreted 
role of the Security Council supports the claim that Council authorization [for the use of force] 
has the ability to raise the costs of unilateral action even in cases where it cannot prevent it. Yet, 
Claude asserts, "collective legitimization is an aspect of the verbal rather than the executive 
functioning of the United Nations, and in some sense it is a result of the organization's 
incapacity for decisive intervention in and control of international relations.,,6o This fact mirrors 
the failed peacekeeping operations examined earlier. Rather than continue to attempt to control 
an increasingly fragmented international system, the Security Council has collectively shifted its 
energies in order to account for the fact that it has been largely unsuccessful in asserting its 
authority otherwise. Collective legitimization thus illustrates, with promising clarity, the fact 
that the Council is able to respond to the realities of the international political environment in 
which it must operate. The inability to do so would see the Security Council face a crisis of 
authority which could diminish its role and prestige in the international community and that of 
the UN more generally. 
In addition to states seeking this collective legitimization to pursue raisons d 'etaf, Voeten 
proposes that UN -authorized interventions may provide a measure of stability and security that 
benefits all nations. I argue, however, that this idea must be taken with a grain of salt given the 
ever-increasing level of strife and violence in numerous countries that have been recipients of 
Security Council intervention forces. Yet, I can agree with V oeten that this emerging norm of 
collective legitimization serves as a mechanism whereby the Security Council facilitates the 
pooling of resources among states. This creates a "bandwagon effect" of sorts whereby Council 
approval stimulates the rapid addition of other states joined by a common interest in a particular 
S9 Cronin & Hurd, pp. 50 
60 Claude, pp. 88 
-35-
Davis 
policy or action. This supports Claude's view that "statesmen take collective legitimacy 
seriously as a factor in international politics.,,61 
Another aspect of collective legitimization deserves mention: the signal it provides to the 
international public about the estimated ramifications of various actions. Indeed the presence or 
absence of Security Council approval, by its intrinsic quality, signals to states the potential 
backlash they may encounter from the international community. Along that vein, Voeten states 
that, Security Council authorization indicates that no costly challenges will result from the 
action. ,,62 This is to say that a state would not feel the need to worry about potential economic or 
trade sanctions by the other actors in the international arena if collective legitimization has taken 
place through Security Council approval. Indeed, by virtue of its very name, collective 
legitimization suggests or implies, rather, that states may reasonably expect some level of 
cooperation from the international community in that particular endeavor. Although, as Voeten 
points out, some states such as Germany, Japan, and India regularly criticize the Security 
Council, they insist (with equal fervor) upon Security Council authorization for uses offorce.63 
Collective legitimization carries with it an intrinsic deficiency in accountability. 
Ultimately, there exists no explicit power by the Security Council over any individual state. 
Therefore, actions approved by the Council are still actions to be taken by a particular state or 
group of states, not the Security Council itself. Owing to this, there is no means (formally, 
legally, institutionally or otherwise) that have emerged or been created by which the greater 
membership of the United Nations (i.e.- the General Assembly) may hold the Security Council 
accountable for the actions and policies it condones in the international arena of political affairs. 
This suggests that the Council operates on a theory of delegation and, furthermore, that the 
61 Ibid, pp. 93 
62 Voeten, pp. 543 
63 Ibid, pp. 544 
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international community accepts that delegation. Thus, the Council is forced to rely on the very 
states it lords over in order to see any form of action taken. The efficacy of Security Council 
resolutions ultimately depends on the willingness of international actors to abide by them. The 
Security Council thus has little power outside the legitimacy conferred upon it by states. And 
yet, the Security Council can also confer upon these same states legitimacy of their actions. 
In order to put a face to what has, to this point, remained an amorphously general idea, 
consider the following example. First and foremost, the United Nations grants a form of 
collective legitimization once it has agreed to seat the representative of a new state. Claude 
stipulates that, "admission to, or seating in, the organization has tended to take on the political 
meaning, if not the legal implication, of collective recognition.,,64 Thus, states feel that their 
existence has been vindicated and upheld by the international community once UN membership 
has been granted. To quote Claude at length, 
"The United Nations was used to characterize as aggression North Korea's attack 
upon South Korea in 1950, and, subsequently, Communist China's collaboration 
in the assault; conversely, the United States sought and won endorsement of a 
collective military response and gave convincing evidence throughout the Korean 
War of its high valuation of the United Nations stamp oflegitimacy. In the 
Congo crisis of 1960, the function of collective legitimization was performed, 
negatively with respect to Belgian intervention, Kantangese secessionist efforts, 
and unilateral Soviet intrusions, and positively with respect to interventions 
organized under United Nations auspices.,,65 
These instances in United Nations history illustrate the fact that collective legitimization may be 
applied to a broad field of issues and that, furthermore, it has become a staple in the political 
calculations of states in the international system. 
v. Emerging Theory: Security Council Reform 
64 
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-37-
Davis 
The Security Council has succeeded in maintaining its prestige over the course of its 
history in international affairs; yet, as it continues to shift its activities toward the role of 
collective legitimization and away from its original mandate as set forth in the UN Charter, 
questions emerge as to whether it remains the legitimate body to provide such legitimization. 
The non-democratic nature of the Council's procedures coupled with its lack of adequate 
geographic representation and reflection of the current power distribution greatly diminish 
international perceptions of legitimacy and authority. Indeed, the call for Security Council 
reform has only amplified with each passing year and typically focuses on two central issues: 
expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership, and expanding or contracting the 
number of states with veto powers. As Cronin and Hurd state, "the Security Council's 
legitimacy is in peril unless the body can be reformed to account for recent changes in world 
politics. ,,66 
Owing to this growing international consensus on the institutional incapacities of the 
Council, scholars and diplomats alike have postulated seemingly endless streams of reform 
proposals designed to rectify the inherent inequities associated with the representation and 
procedures of that body. To be sure, Thomas Weiss adds, "Most governments rhetorically 
support the mindless call for equity, specifically by increasing membership and eliminating the 
veto. Yet, no progress has been made on these numerical or procedural changes because 
absolutely no consensus exists about the exact shape of the Security Council or the elimination 
of the veto.,,67 
66 Cronin & Hurd, pp. 212 
67 Weiss, T. The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, The Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 2003), pp. 149 
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Expanding the existing membership within the Council is discussed at length in a book 
entitled The United Nations and Changing World Politics.68 In this book, two models are put 
forth which focus on the equal distribution of regional representation. Model A would see the 
creation of six new permanent seats (naked of the veto power), and three new nonpermanent 
seats thus raising the total membership of the Council to twenty-four. Model B, although 
similar, would alternatively see the creation of a new category of eight seats on the Council with 
four-year renewable terms and one new nonpermanent seat with a nonrenewable two-year 
term.69 
Expanding Council membership seems to be a valid attempt at strengthening the 
representative nature of the Council at first glance. However, scholars who support this idea 
seem to ignore the fact that the Council was deliberately created as a restricted body charged 
with the maintenance of international peace and security, not as a purely democratic organ of 
global governance. Moreover, as Weiss points out, "a Security Council of21 to 25 members 
would hardly improve effectiveness.,,7o This suggests the existence of two competing goals for 
UN Security Council reform: equity among members of the UN (proper process), and effective 
operation of the Council (results). This process-results dichotomy has retarded reform efforts as 
neither camp has been able to galvanize dominant support within the international community. 
Furthermore, the notion of expanding the membership of the Council from 15 to 21 or 25 fails to 
consider, as Weiss does, the fact that the group would be too large to conduct serious 
negotiations and yet still too small to represent the UN membership as a whole.71 It is important 
to note that the Security Council was never designed to be reflective of UN membership and thus 
68 Coate, R., et al. The United Nations and Changing World Politics, pp. 112-114 
69 Models discussed here were laid out on pg 113 of the preceeding footnote. 
70 Weiss, pp. 149 
71 Ibid, pp. 151 
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scores poorly under examination in that context. While expanding the membership of the 
Council would certainly buttress its legitimacy, it would also dilute the effective application of 
power to the suppression of aggressive flashpoints across the globe. 
The issue of the veto has equally confounded international legal scholars and diplomats 
interested in reforming the Council. In his examination of the veto power, Weiss discusses the 
fact that Article 108 of the UN Charter effectively provides each permanent member with a 
trump card that can overrule any efforts to weaken its formal power. The veto has been and 
remains an obstacle to reform both because of the P5's vested interests in preserving power and 
because no provision in the Charter requires them to relinquish this right. 72 Indeed, the veto 
establishes and maintains the preponderance of the P5 over the nonpermanent members of the 
Council. Furthermore, states endowed with this "ultimate tool" of the Council will be hard 
pressed to agree to the general UN membership revoking or altering the power therein. Owing to 
this, any significant formal restructuring of the Councilor its powers is very unlikely. The 
Council was created to be, and remains, an organ focused on maintaining the status quo in the 
international community. 
Surrounding this debate over reform is another issue which, to date, has received little 
concerted effort to remedy: the reliance of the Council upon the might of the United States armed 
forces to carry out its resolutions. Weiss explains that, "as the UN's coercive capacity is always 
on loan, UN-led or UN-approved military operations take place only when Washington signs 
on.,,73 This suggests that a growing trend of the Council has involved attempting to either limit 
the unilateral use of American military force or channel it towards meaningful international, 
72 Ibid, pp. 151 
73 Ibid, pp. 153 
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multilateral endeavors. In support of this notion, Cronin and Hurd state, "the most extensive UN 
authorizations of force were almost all in cases where the U.S. (and its allies) either implicitly or 
explicitly threatened to act outside the Council. This is certainly true for the first Gulf War, 
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.,,74 Again, Weiss states it most succinctly, "if 
the Security Council is to enforce its collective decisions, U.S. participation is, at present and for 
the foreseeable future, a sine qua non.,,75 Although this presents a picture of the Security 
Council acting as a pet to the preferences of American foreign policy, "policy-makers of the 
United States and other influential states are well aware that Council authority can boost the 
authority of their own states to engage in extensive intervention. Thus they have welcomed the 
extension of Council authority into peace building because it legitimates interventions by 
coalition of the willing states as interventions done on behalf of the global community.,,76 There 
is no way to escape or ignore the fact, however, that there exists no international mechanism to 
stop the U.S. from pursuing what it perceives to be its national security interests. 
In response to the growing legitimacy gap and other issues enumerated above, ''the 
processes of diplomatic problem solving and its collective legitimization have become 
increasingly decoupled. The former tends to be delegated to informal groups or coalitions of 
states, while the Council provides the latter.,,77 Indeed, it appears that nonmember states have 
constructed a tentative scaffold upon which they are able to serve as a safety valve of sorts. 
Owing to the increasing demands on the UN to adapt to the security environment of the post-
bipolar world, the use of informal groups of states has proliferated according to Jochen Prantl. 
Moreover, Prantl stipulates that, "informal groups of states serve as a mechanism that allow for 
74 Cronin & Hurd, pp. 53 
75 Weiss, pp. 153 
76 Cronin & Hurd, pp. 167 
77 Prantl, J. Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, pp. 559 
-41-
Davis 
exit from structural constraints of the Security Council and voice for stakeholders in a 
conflict." 78 
Although the P5 are likely to stonewall any earnest efforts to reform formally the 
Security Council, informal groups of states have offered an innovative approach to overcoming 
the pitfalls of the Council without upsetting the great powers of the world. Prantl suggests, 
"these groups may be instrumental in incrementally adapting the Security Council to systemic 
change. At the same time, they may alleviate unanticipated effects. In consequence, ad hoc 
mechanisms may accommodate the potential to serve as a stabilizing element for international 
institutions in transition." 79 Thus, by circumventing the formal process of seeking an 
amendment to the UN Charter, informal groups of states stand to relieve the Council of certain 
responsibilities that have compounded operational deficiencies over recent decades. In addition 
to addressing the issue of "Council overload," informal groups of states allow for a more 
continuous approach to dealing with international disputes as members are not rotating off in 
two-year cycles. Prantl supports this idea when he states, ''the very concept of nonpermanent 
membership is an impediment to any long-term commitment toward a conflict, especially a civil 
war.,,80 To be sure, it is difficult to imagine a remotely consistent approach towards particular 
disputes when states may face rotating off the Council in the midst of a critical situation. 
Additionally, informal groups of states ensure that stakeholders in a conflict are party to 
discussions concerning a resolution. 
The long-term effects of this emerging trend in international affairs will obviously take 
some time before they become readily apparent. Until then, Prantl has posited several ways in 
78 Ibid, pp. 561 
79 Ibid, pp. 563 
80 Ibid, pp. 570 
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which these informal groups of states affect power relationships at the UN. The first states that 
they [informal groups of states] amplify the relative influence of stakeholders, which are not 
being represented by members of the Security Council. The second way Prantl suggests is that 
informal settings balance the preponderance of the P5 of the Security Council. The third 
stipulates that informal groups of states have the potential to disguise U.S. hegemony.81 Taken 
together, these effects of the growing influence of informal groups of states suggest yet another 
shift is occurring in the relationship between individual states and the Security Council at large. 
Furthermore, Prantl suggests that these informal groups may ultimately come to pre-negotiate 
and draft Council resolutions in such a precise manner that substantial change is almost 
impossible in subsequent stages when the matter comes under official consideration in the 
Council. 82 These groups, then, seem to represent not so much a rejection of Security Council 
legitimization rather than a creative effort to overcome areas where the Council has historically 
struggled with its responsibilities to the international community. Rather than attempt to disrupt 
the established order within the Security Council, these informal groups of states represent a 
means of generating an adaptation process in response to altered structural conditions.83 Indeed, 
Prantl suggests that the growing recourse to informal arrangements appears as the "cheaper 
option" than a complete overhaul of the organization's foundations, that is, the revision of the 
UN Charter.84 
While many scholars continue to push the agenda of instituting widespread systemic 
alterations both to the composition and procedures of the Council, I propose a somewhat 
different strategy. The annual birdsong of states outside the Council naively calls for the 
81 Ibid, pp. 579 
82 Ibid, pp. 580 
83 Ibid, pp. 588 
84 Ibid, pp. 588 
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complete elimination of the veto power as well as the addition of an unknown number of seats on 
the Council. Granted, the expansion of Security Council membership would certainly bolster the 
perception of procedural accountability and legitimacy on the international stage. Yet, such an 
approach would see the Council crippled by the multiplied effect of competing interests if a large 
number of new seats were created. Would the Council be viewed as more legitimate? Yes. 
Would the Council be more effective in pursuit of its responsibilities? Unlikely. Thus, it is clear 
that the notion of effectiveness is separate from that of institutional legitimacy and 
accountability. 
In pursuit of this notion of greater effectiveness, I submit a potential remedy which would 
only slightly alter the current operation of the Security Council: increasing the requisite number 
of negative votes (i.e.-vetoes) from the P5 from one to three before a resolution may be halted. 
Additionally, this increase in the requisite number of vetoes would be coupled with a clause 
which would allow the override of a veto if a given number of states on the Council voted to do 
so. Beyond that, three new permanent seats (each with the power of the veto) would be added to 
the Council; Europe would potentially see the addition of Germany as a permanent member if 
relations with France were to improve, while the region of Asia would potentially see the 
addition of Japan if relations with both China and Russia were smoothed over. The third seat 
would potentially see the addition ofIndia. If such a system were to be implemented it would 
reinforce the UN framer's intention of maintaining a consensus among the great powers, albeit in 
a negative aspect. Furthermore, the option of the override would rid the Council of the aura of 
being a slave to the whims of the individual P5 states. Indeed, under this system states would be 
more assured of great power consensus if at least three of the P5 states jointly vetoed an action as 
opposed to the current system of requiring only a single stonewalling P5 state. As a result of this 
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tweak to the existing framework of the Council, resolutions would stand a better chance of 
surviving the gauntlet represented by the competing interests of Council members. Moreover, 
the addition of three new permanent seats on the Council would be enough to strengthen the 
Council's image of legitimacy while, at the same time, preventing almost certain gridlock that 
would emerge as a result of further enlargement. It is possible, then, to imagine a more active 
Security Council should such a policy manage to get approved by both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council. 
Adding to its appeal for the P5, this option wouldn't involve the direct elimination of 
their veto powers as prescribed by other UN reformists. However, finding an incentive to get the 
P5 to sign off on an override option would prove exceedingly difficult and could potentially stall 
this particular effort on reform. The question emerges: how do you provide an incentive enticing 
enough to get the world's strongest states to sign on? This question is highlighted by the fact 
that one P5 state, the U.S., essentially holds all the cards at this point in time. How do you entice 
a rabbit with a carrot when that rabbit currently holds all the other carrots? Certainly, it will 
prove quite difficult to reform an institution that was inherently designed to resist change and has 
over sixty years experience in the field as it were. Furthermore, this proposal would face an 
enormous obstacle as it would require nothing short of an amendment to the UN Charter. A note 
to illustrate just how difficult such a feat would be: amendments to the UN Charter have 
succeeded in only three instances in the course of UN existence over a span of more than sixty 
years. While this is not a bright statistic for the chances of success for a Charter amendment, the 
fact remains that concerted effort combined with widespread support (especially from the P5) 
has succeeded in the past and may be able to succeed again in the future of the organization. 
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It is important to remember that this reform proposal stands as a limited solution in light 
of continuing u.s. hegemony. The fact that the U.S. would still be capable of opting to work 
outside the UN framework severely limits the extent to which any reform could be successful. 
Thus, it seems only prudent to suggest that reformers focus their energies on finding new, and 
perhaps, informal methods of aligning U.S. and international interests. To take a page from the 
theory of public policy, the framing of a problem can have a significant impact on whether a 
given solution is adopted. Thus it would make sense for reformists to frame problems in such a 
way as to align them with u.s. interests. Until a military force comparable to the might of the 
u.s. comes to fruition and is able to fulfill the former role of the U.S., reform policies will 
continue to revolve around the primacy of Washington in world politics. 
It is true the Security Council stands as a legitimate source for the collective 
legitimization of state action, albeit in a limited role. The Council occupies a unique position in 
the international arena which is bolstered by the membership of the world's superpowers, and it 
has incrementally expanded its authority and legitimacy on a case-by-case basis. While the 
Council has emerged as the natural "first stop" on the road for states seeking to justify certain 
actions, it would seem that collective legitimization, at its core, is a political function and one 
that is not well represented by an international organ in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. Perhaps 
more appropriate for this coveted role would be the somewhat less prestigious, yet far more 
politically legitimate, General Assembly (GA). Granted, the GA has become increasingly 
politicized in recent years; however, the fact that it is not overshadowed by the preponderance of 
great powers and that it operates on a "one state-one vote" system suggests that it would be a 
more appropriate body to provide such collective legitimization. The process of the GA stepping 
into that role, however, would likely mirror the path taken by the Council: a gradual, case-by-
-46-
Davis 
case expansion of authority. In addition, the sheer size of the GA (192 member states) would 
certainly provide a more comprehensive assessment of state actions as compared to the 15 
member states of the Security Council. While the efficacy of this notion is subject to 
speculation, it would seem that, on the issue of legitimacy, the GA stands as the superior 
candidate for the role. 
VI. Concluding Thoughts on the Council 
The Security Council remains the primary international body charged with the 
maintenance of peace and security in international politics. Yet, it is apparent that the Council 
has evolved to fulfill a new role as provider of legitimization as a result of poor performance in 
the areas of peacekeeping, peace-building, and peace-enforcement. The collective experiences 
of UN operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda clearly illustrate the institutional constraints 
and incapacities under which the Council is forced to operate. Although the Council was 
designed to function within a scheme of collective security, the effective implementation of that 
approach to international conflicts has been shown to be the exception rather than the norm. 
Collective security demands far more from states than they are often willing to provide, and only 
further highlights the inability of the Council to achieve its original UN mandate. Indeed, in 
order for collective security to operate effectively as a tool in the international system, those 
states that subscribe to the theory must be willing to back up the threat of force with the actual 
use of force. Beyond that, pinning down a concrete definition of aggression in an ever-evolving 
international system also poses an enormous obstacle to the fulfillment of collective security and 
has marred numerous Security Council attempts to implement a stable collective security regime. 
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Chief among the issues faced by the Security Council, in the failed operations examined 
earlier, was the tendency of member states to allow their discussions to become bogged down in 
the technical or legal definitions of words like "civil war," "genocide," and "sovereignty" in the 
early stages of a crisis. As a result of this "tunnel vision," the Security Council was often shown 
to lose sight of its primary objective in international politics: the maintenance of peace and 
security. Moreover, a common theme emerged as a result of the examination of these 
operations: states, especially the P5, simply lacked the will to see the operations through to the 
fullest extent necessary, at times because the states that would be leading the effort have lost 
their will. As a result, the Security Council faced a crisis of legitimacy which it sought to 
remedy through the act of collectively legitimizing state actions. This process, however, was 
gradual and incremental. The Security Council seized upon opportunities whereby it could 
expand its authority to address new and varied international issues. Owing to this, the 
international community has come to view the Council in this new role as a provider of 
legitimization. 
Many scholars believe that this unique legitimacy springs from the sociological aspect of 
international authority; in other words, the Council is only able to fulfill its role of legitimizing 
state action if the actors within the international community buy into the perception that they 
need external political reassurance. It was shown that states, even the proverbial juggernaut as 
embodied by the U.S., indeed buy into this new role for the Security Council as evinced by the 
adamant pursuit of its approval. Collective legitimization thus illustrates, with promising clarity, 
the fact that the Council is able to respond to the realities of the international political 
environment in which it must operate. The inability to do so would see the Security Council face 
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a crisis of authority and legitimacy which could diminish its role and prestige in the international 
community. 
While it is clear that the international community has come to view collective 
legitimization as an appropriate function of the Security Council, there are issues which, if left 
unaddressed, could see the Council lose the legitimacy it has labored so long to establish. Issues 
such as the lack of democratic operation within the Council, as well as the lack of equal 
geographic representation, and the failure to reflect recent shifts in the international distribution 
of power stand to erode the foundation upon which the Council currently stands. To be sure, 
efforts at reform are in constant supply, and have occupied the minds of scholars and diplomats 
for the better part of the past thirty years. Often, these efforts have proven to be simplistic and 
particularly naIve of the political realities that must be taken into account if any reform is to be 
successfully implemented. Finding a way to gamer the approval of the P5 has shown itself to be 
a key component for these reform efforts; yet the question of what incentive could impel those 
states, especially the global hegemon, to sign on continues to elude an adequate solution. 
The unique reforms posited in section V by no means offer a comprehensive solution for the 
issue of Security Council legitimacy, nor do they stand a significant chance of being implemented in the 
absence of PS approval. Rather, the reforms that have been suggested more readily serve the purpose 
of feeding the flames of thought for both current and future scholars attempting to reform a body that 
was inherently designed to resist change. Indeed, until a method can be devised whereby reform 
initiatives may circumvent an unwilling Councilor the PS are willing to surrender the power they have 
guarded for over sixty years, the international community will be forced to operate under the auspices 
of a Security Council whose legitimacy may, at times, be called into question. 
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